سنا الفنار
سنا الفنار
السلام عليكم.. ممكن أحد يترجم لي هذي القطع.. Dislike and Envy as Antecedents of Pleasure at Another’s Misfortune1 Shlomo Hareli2;4 and Bernard Weiner3;4 Previous research related to pleasure at another’s misfortune has focused on the role of envy and competition in inducing such feelings. Additionally, some views assume that this emotion is restricted to mild misfortunes. In this paper, we propose that other-directed negative emotions (e.g., dislike and anger), independent of envy, can give rise to pleasure at another’s misfortune and the misfortune can be severe when these other emotions are causal. In addition to providing support for this view in three studies, pleasure at another’s misfortune was also associated with different factors when other-directed negative emotions as opposed to envy served as its eliciting condition. For example, given that dislike caused pleasure at another’s misfortune, the misfortune was more likely to be perceived as deserved, any misfortune was pleasing, and the observer was more reluctant to help than given envy as the cause..
السلام عليكم.. ممكن أحد يترجم لي هذي القطع.. Dislike and Envy as Antecedents of Pleasure at...
ENVY REVISITED
Patricia Polledri
ABSTRACT This paper is a study of the concept and the affect of envy. Because
of its singular dynamics, envy rarely appears in a straightforward or direct
manner, so a consideration of the various ways in which envy influences interpersonal
relationships is examined in relation to the consequences of early
pathological attachments. A distinction between envy, jealousy and greed, and
the part shame plays in relation to envious tension will be examined as well as
the phenomenon of self-envy. Various theoretical models will be discussed in
terms of their usefulness and application to the clinical material. Rather than
seeking to alter or amend the theoretical grounds on the concept of envy, this
paper focuses on the expression of envy as a form of destructive behaviour –
destructive to the patient, to his objects and to the therapeutic process.
Introduction
Envy is a state of extreme tension, torment and ill will, provoked by an overwhelming
sense of inferiority, impotence and worthlessness and conversely
an awareness and fear of worth, prestige and superiority in another. It begins
in the eye of the beholder and is so painful to the mind that the envious
person will go to almost any lengths to diminish, if not destroy, whatever or
whoever may have aroused it (Berke 1985).
Iago, in Shakespeare’s Othello, is a master of cunning and deceit. He is
exploiting his own and Othello’s feelings for the purpose of Othello’s
downfall. His ensuing knavery is far worse than physical abuse or even
murder; it involves a compulsion to destroy the very essence of the victim
through the conscious mischief-making, lies and manipulation which he
relishes. In his ruthless urge to annihilate Othello’s quality, power and
integrity, Iago attacks his victim from within; he is a psychic sadist who
wreaks vengeance by destroying Othello’s peace of mind. Iago demonstrates
a central feature of envious ill will – the determination to undermine
happiness in the other and replace contentment and calm with agitation
سنا الفنار
سنا الفنار
ENVY REVISITED Patricia Polledri ABSTRACT This paper is a study of the concept and the affect of envy. Because of its singular dynamics, envy rarely appears in a straightforward or direct manner, so a consideration of the various ways in which envy influences interpersonal relationships is examined in relation to the consequences of early pathological attachments. A distinction between envy, jealousy and greed, and the part shame plays in relation to envious tension will be examined as well as the phenomenon of self-envy. Various theoretical models will be discussed in terms of their usefulness and application to the clinical material. Rather than seeking to alter or amend the theoretical grounds on the concept of envy, this paper focuses on the expression of envy as a form of destructive behaviour – destructive to the patient, to his objects and to the therapeutic process. Introduction Envy is a state of extreme tension, torment and ill will, provoked by an overwhelming sense of inferiority, impotence and worthlessness and conversely an awareness and fear of worth, prestige and superiority in another. It begins in the eye of the beholder and is so painful to the mind that the envious person will go to almost any lengths to diminish, if not destroy, whatever or whoever may have aroused it (Berke 1985). Iago, in Shakespeare’s Othello, is a master of cunning and deceit. He is exploiting his own and Othello’s feelings for the purpose of Othello’s downfall. His ensuing knavery is far worse than physical abuse or even murder; it involves a compulsion to destroy the very essence of the victim through the conscious mischief-making, lies and manipulation which he relishes. In his ruthless urge to annihilate Othello’s quality, power and integrity, Iago attacks his victim from within; he is a psychic sadist who wreaks vengeance by destroying Othello’s peace of mind. Iago demonstrates a central feature of envious ill will – the determination to undermine happiness in the other and replace contentment and calm with agitation
ENVY REVISITED Patricia Polledri ABSTRACT This paper is a study of the concept and the affect...
Feeling of `lacking' as the core of envy: a conceptual analysis of envy
The aim of this paper is to explore the subjective experience of envy through
concept analysis. Further, the study on which it is based aimed to answer
questions about the composition and manifestations of envy. From the viewpoint
of nursing science, the analysis of envy is based on a desire to understand
human beings from the perspective of subjective health and illness and thus
from a health promotion perspective. Envy is conceived of as a dimension of a
person's health and illness. The concept is therefore meaningful from the
viewpoint of nursing; it describes a phenomenon which enables us to deepen
our understanding in a way relevant to nursing science. In the study the hybrid
model developed by Schwartz-Barcott et al. was used for conceptual elaboration.
In the theoretical phase of the study the subjective experience of envy was
explored from the viewpoints of philosophy, religion, Finnish folklore and
psychoanalysis, as well as nursing science. As a synthesis of these, a conceptual
analysis of envy adapted from Wilson was conducted and a working de®nition
of envy was proposed. In the ®eldwork phase, envy was examined by means of
an empirical analysis using a phenomenological approach. As a result, a
classi®cation describing the experience of envy was presented. The core
experience of envy has been de®ned as a `lacking', and the object of envy as
something good possessed by someone else. Envy manifests itself in both
destructiveness and creativity. The trends of development of envy are in¯exibility
and emancipation, and the essence of envy is multidimensional. Finally,
the working de®nition of the concept was elaborated on the basis of the
empirical phase and a new de®nition re¯ecting the composition and manifestations
of envy was proposed.
سنا الفنار
سنا الفنار
Feeling of `lacking' as the core of envy: a conceptual analysis of envy The aim of this paper is to explore the subjective experience of envy through concept analysis. Further, the study on which it is based aimed to answer questions about the composition and manifestations of envy. From the viewpoint of nursing science, the analysis of envy is based on a desire to understand human beings from the perspective of subjective health and illness and thus from a health promotion perspective. Envy is conceived of as a dimension of a person's health and illness. The concept is therefore meaningful from the viewpoint of nursing; it describes a phenomenon which enables us to deepen our understanding in a way relevant to nursing science. In the study the hybrid model developed by Schwartz-Barcott et al. was used for conceptual elaboration. In the theoretical phase of the study the subjective experience of envy was explored from the viewpoints of philosophy, religion, Finnish folklore and psychoanalysis, as well as nursing science. As a synthesis of these, a conceptual analysis of envy adapted from Wilson was conducted and a working de®nition of envy was proposed. In the ®eldwork phase, envy was examined by means of an empirical analysis using a phenomenological approach. As a result, a classi®cation describing the experience of envy was presented. The core experience of envy has been de®ned as a `lacking', and the object of envy as something good possessed by someone else. Envy manifests itself in both destructiveness and creativity. The trends of development of envy are in¯exibility and emancipation, and the essence of envy is multidimensional. Finally, the working de®nition of the concept was elaborated on the basis of the empirical phase and a new de®nition re¯ecting the composition and manifestations of envy was proposed.
Feeling of `lacking' as the core of envy: a conceptual analysis of envy The aim of this paper is...
وهذي أخر وحده والله يسعد اللي ترد علي..
JEALOUSY IN RELATION TO ENVY
ABSTRACT. The conceptions of jealousy used by philosophical writers are various, and,
this paper suggests, largely inadequate. In particular, the difference between jealousy and
envy has not yet been plausibly specified. This paper surveys some past analyses of this
distinction and addresses problems with them, before proposing its own positive account of
jealousy, developed from an idea of Leila Tov-Ruach (a.k.a. A. O. Rorty). Three conditions
for being jealous are proposed and it is shown how each of them helps to tell the emotion
apart from some distinct species of envy. It is acknowledged that the referents of the two
terms are, to some extent, overlapping, but shown how this overlap is justified by the
psychologies of the respective emotions.
Jealousy has received a fair amount of attention from philosophers,
much of it concerning its normative assessment, in ethical terms or for
rationality.1 The accounts of jealousy used to underpin these discussions,
however, are marked by numerous disagreements and, this paper will
argue, inadequacies. In particular, previous authors adhere to different accounts
of the distinction between jealousy and envy; none of which, it will
be claimed, is fully adequate to way these terms are actually used to characterise
different emotional states. This paper addresses such shortcomings
by offering an account of jealousy that fits, as well as possible, with the
phenomenon as recognised; and distinguishes it, as far as possible, from
various species of envy. The paper’s structure is straightforward: Section
1 contains introductory remarks about methodology; Section 2 comprises
criticisms of previous philosophers’ accounts of the jealousy-envy distinction;
and Section 3 works towards a new positive account, adapting the
ideas of other writers where necessary. The paper concludes with brief
remarks about the applications of this analysis.
Erkenntnis 60:
bent_jeddah_alcool
bent_jeddah_alcool
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Eng.I
Eng.I
السلام عليكم انا عندي عباره بسيطه sending of file failed ياريت الاخوات يساعدوني بالترجمه
السلام عليكم انا عندي عباره بسيطه sending of file failed ياريت الاخوات يساعدوني بالترجمه
ارسال الفايل قد فشل